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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates whether by exposing superiors to moral symbols subordinates can 
discourage their superiors from asking them to perform unethical acts. Findings from five 
laboratory studies and one organizational survey study demonstrated that exposure to moral 
symbols displayed by the subordinates dissuades superiors from both engaging in unethical 
behaviors themselves and asking their subordinates to engage in unethical behavior. This paper 
shows that the display of moral symbols leads to two main consequences of (1) the activation of 
the concept of morality and increases in individuals’ moral awareness to decrease unethical 
behavior, and (2) eliciting inferences about the moral character of the displayer to lower the 
likelihood of that person being subjected to unethical directives. Additionally, our findings 
demonstrate that moral symbols influence ethical decisions without provoking hidden backlash 
effects against those who display them. In sum, our findings show that followers can serve as a 
form of social influence to guide their leader’s behavior and reduce the occurrence of unethical 
acts in the workplace. 
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When the NationsBank scandal came to light several years ago, securities brokers who 
used to work there revealed that their superior had asked them to peddle high risk mutual funds 
to clients about to retire who specifically wanted to avoid investing in such funds (Tahmincioglu, 
2000). The brokers realized that what they were being asked to do was unethical but they felt 
caught between their principles and payday. Indeed, according to a National Business Ethics 
Survey, in 2013, 9% of employees perceived pressure to compromise ethics standards in order to 
do their jobs (Ethics Resource Center, 2013). Now, imagine yourself as a confidant to one such 
employee; what helpful suggestions might you offer? Note that retaliation against employees 
reporting misconduct was at 21% in 2013 (Ethics Resource Center, 2013); thus challenging or 
confronting the boss would be a difficult proposition. How can employees change organizational 
authorities’ behavior and discourage unethical directives? 
Management scholars, as well as, managers, employees, and the general public tend to 
focus on the question of how leaders influence followers’ ethical behaviors. However, an equally 
important and interesting question, which has been relatively underexplored is, “How followers 
can change a leader’s ethical decisions and behavior?” Whereas existing research for the most 
part has taken a top down perspective (e.g., Mayer, Aquino, Greenbaum, & Kuenzi, 2012; 
Palmer, 2008; Treviño & Brown, 2004) and examined how organizational authorities can 
influence employees, we focus on a bottom up perspective and examine how employees may 
influence superiors without incurring their wrath. We are particularly interested in examining 
how employees can discourage organizational authorities from asking them, in particular, to 
commit unethical acts.  
Just as wearing a necklace of garlic can help ward off mythological vampires (Stoker, 
1897/2011), in this paper, we examine the possibility of offering subordinates a safe way in 
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which they may prevent their superiors from asking them to perform unethical acts. Specifically, 
we investigate the idea that by exposing their superiors to moral symbols1 such as words, 
images, or mundane objects, subordinates may discourage unethical acts overall and also 
dissuade superiors from asking them to engage in unethical acts. An emerging stream of research 
in moral psychology and behavioral ethics shows that accessibility of moral constructs influences 
ethical decisions, judgments, and behaviors (Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim, & Felps, 2009; 
Gunia, Wang, Huang, Wang, & Murnighan, 2012; Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). As such, the 
use of moral symbols while interacting with leaders could be a source of social influence for 
followers to discourage unethicality. Individuals’ ethical decision making has been shown to 
depend on the social influence they are exposed to (Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2009; Pitesa & Thau, 
2013; Sonenshein, 2007; Treviño, 1986).  
Our objective in this article is to propose and empirically test a theoretical model that 
explains how and why in interpersonal contexts—including subordinate-supervisor relationships 
in spite of the inherent power asymmetries—the display of moral symbols, even though subtle in 
nature, decreases unethical behaviors. This paper focuses on subordinates’ moral choices and 
behaviors and their role in helping supervisors’ ethical behaviors in the organizational context. 
We draw from a dual-system or synthetic framework for morality (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 
2006; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Haidt, 2001; Moore & Gino, 2015)—
which emphasizes the role of both automatic and controlled processes in moral judgment and 
behavior—to suggest that moral symbols (1) make moral constructs accessible and increase 
                                                 
1 Note that our construct of moral symbol is a subset of a similar sounding construct called moral identity 
symbolization which refers to a dimension of moral identity that causes people to demonstrate their possession of 
moral traits through moral actions or objects (Aquino & Reed, 2002). Whereas moral identity symbolization also 
includes behaviors such as involvement in activities that communicate to others one’s moral characteristics (e.g., 
hobbies), our definition of moral symbols is slightly narrower to include moral objects (e.g., moral accessories, 
images, quotes).   
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moral awareness, and (2) elicit inferences about the moral character of the displayer. This latter 
aspect, in particular, would serve the purpose of shielding the displayer from being asked to 
engage in unethical behaviors as a result of perceived moral character.  
This paper makes a number of important contributions. First, we extend the business 
ethics literature by examining socio-psychological processes that encourage ethical behavior. 
Second, unlike most of existing research that has taken a top down perspective, we examine a 
bottom up social influence phenomenon and examine the importance of subordinates’ choices 
and behaviors in influencing authorities’ ethical behaviors. Third, this paper extends prior work 
on moral identity in an important way by examining moral displays in an interpersonal context. 
Fourth, whistle-blowing literature has shown that perceived personal risk and, in particular, fear 
of retaliation, are the primary reasons for employees being generally reluctant to report work-
rated transgressions (Miceli, Near, & Dworkin, 2013). Employees are often penalized for 
reporting or speaking up about unethical conduct (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005). We 
contribute to this work by examining the consequences of exposing one’s superior to moral 
symbols. We demonstrate that the use of moral symbols does not bring hidden backlash effects 
against those who display moral symbols. It changes the perception of the situation and elicits 
inferences about the moral character of the follower, both guiding the leader’s behavior. Thus 
our work offers a way to help employees to say “no” in a non-conflictive and preemptive 
manner.  
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Moral symbols are associated strongly with moral concepts in people’s minds; they could 
be material objects such as a cross that have come to acquire moral meaning and value through 
ritualized behavior (see Dittmar, 1992; Miller, 1998). Another example of symbols could be 
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posters of moral prototypes (Walker & Hennig, 2004) such as Mahatma Gandhi who have come 
to be recognized in the collective conscious of a given society for their ethical practices. 
Alternately, they could be explicit quotations exhorting people to be virtuous. Research has 
shown that when symbols and concepts are closely associated, on being exposed to the symbol, 
the related concept automatically becomes more accessible to the mind (see Bargh, 1994, 2007). 
For instance, on seeing a gun, one may not only automatically think of violence but also become 
more likely to behave aggressively (Anderson, Benjamin, & Bartholow, 1998). In fact, past 
research has shown that moral primes manipulate the accessibility of moral constructs and 
influence subsequent moral choices and behavior (Aquino et al., 2009; Mazar et al., 2008; Welsh 
& Ordonez, 2014). That is, if certain symbols (for example, words such as “honest,” or objects 
such as a “cross”) come to embody moral meanings (such as “honorable” or “godliness”) then 
exposure to such symbols increases the accessibility of the construct of morality and individuals’ 
construal of the situation as a moral one (Kay, Wheeler, Bargh, & Ross, 2004; Kouchaki, Smith-
Crowe, Brief, & Sousa, 2013).  
Of particular relevance to our interest on the effects of moral symbols on ethical behavior 
is the role that both automatic and deliberate processes play in moral judgment and behavior. We 
suggest that followers interacting with their leaders can use moral symbols as a source of social 
influence to discourage unethicality in their organizations through both automatic and deliberate 
processes. A longstanding debate in moral psychology is the question whether moral judgment 
and behavior arise from deliberate or automatic processes. Scholars following the tradition of 
rational decision making have emphasized the role of deliberate, conscious reasoning and 
considered moral judgment and behavior to be an outcome of cognitive, deliberate processes 
(Kohlberg, 1981; Rest, 1986). Others have challenged this conscious reasoning perspective and 
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argued that there may be automatic, reflexive and intuitive aspects to ethical decision making 
(e.g., Greene & Haidt, 2002; Haidt, 2001). For example, Reynolds (2006) emphasized the role of 
automaticity and non-conscious priming in his neurocognitive model of moral decision-making 
built around the concept of “prototypes” that are activated nonconsciously on exposure to 
relevant environmental cues. As per his model, one way the human mind identifies moral issues 
is by making use of prototypes that are based on past experience with stimuli. Prototypes can 
represent sounds, language, objects, scenes, situations, concepts, and even complex social 
interactions. Based on his model, moral symbols can elicit moral cognition nonconsciously.  
Adopting a middle ground, some researchers have endorsed a dual-system perspective 
and have argued that both deliberate reasoning and automaticity play a role in moral judgment 
and behavior (Cushman et al., 2006; Greene, 2009; Haidt, 2001; Monin, Pizarro, & Beer, 2007). 
Here, we do not intend to engage in a debate of which type of processing plays a more important 
role; we concur with Moore and Gino’s (2015) position that it may be “more accurate to call the 
model “synthetic” (Greene et al., 2004) rather than dual-process, since rational and non-
deliberative processes appear to be co-dependent and work cooperatively as often as they 
compete” (p. 245).  
Of particular relevance to understanding the impact of moral symbols on supervisors’ 
ethical decision making is the two-stage “signaling-processing” model put forth by Tenbrunsel 
and Messick (1999). According to this model, in Stage 1 of decision making, environmental cues 
send signals which influence the way a situation is perceived, and consequently affect the 
construal of the situation and the decision frame that is adopted. In Stage 2, the adopted 
perception of the situation offers a lens through which the situation is perceived as 
predominantly having economic or social considerations. For example, the presence of sanctions 
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in an environment may send an implicit message of mistrust to employees in Stage 1 and make 
them perceive the situation as one that warrants attention to ways of deflecting penalties, as 
opposed to a situation requiring cooperation, and thus, might promote the use of a competitive 
decision frame (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999). In Stage 2, the competitive decision frame 
adopted (even though it may have been adopted nonconsciously) may result in conscious 
thoughts focused on self-interest, which lead to competitive behavior. Importantly, Tenbrunsel 
and Smith-Crowe (2008) argue that decision frames inform moral awareness. Compared to 
business or legal frames, under the influence of an ethics frame, decision makers are morally 
aware. Thus, if the situational context in Stage 1 causes decision-makers to adopt an ethics 
frame, subsequently in Stage 2, they are morally aware and social considerations play a role in 
decision making.  
In keeping with the two-stage model of ethical decision making, we argue that exposure 
to moral symbols displayed by one’s subordinates is likely to increase moral awareness, which in 
turn, affects ensuing ethical behavior. Relevant to our theorizing, the accessibility of the 
construct of morality as a consequence of exposure to moral symbols (Stage 1) increases moral 
awareness  (Stage 2) by making people recognize that the situation at hand may contain “moral 
content and legitimately can be considered from a moral point of view” (Reynolds, 2006). 
Importantly, we believe that regardless of whether there is a division between automaticity and 
deliberation and where it is placed, or whether both processes are co-dependent and work 
cooperatively, both conscious reasoning and automaticity can play a role in determining ethical 
behavior after exposure to moral symbols. It is possible that the accessibility of the construct of 
morality may result in conscious thoughts focused on morality—permitting but not guaranteeing 
a role for conscious reasoning. It is also possible that if subordinates display moral symbols, their 
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superiors may consciously register the presence of moral symbols but not necessarily be aware of 
the impact of such symbols on their cognitive processes. And, it is also very likely that exposure 
to moral symbols automatically makes the construct of morality accessible and increases moral 
awareness, but individuals may not necessarily be aware of the impact of such symbols on their 
interpretation and construal of the situation (their moral awareness). Overall, we predict the 
following:  
Hypothesis 1:  Supervisors exposed to moral symbols of their subordinates are less likely 
to engage in unethical behavior than those not exposed to such symbols. 
Hypothesis 2:  Moral awareness mediates the relationship between exposure to moral 
symbols displayed by subordinates and likelihood of a superior to engage in unethical 
behavior.  
For our first hypothesis we relied on the activation of the concept of morality in general 
and the increase in one’s moral awareness (i.e., to construe the situation as one with moral 
implications), to influence ethical behavior. However, in addition to increased moral awareness, 
in an interpersonal context potentially laden with asymmetrical power relationships, we propose 
that the display of moral symbols may also elicit inferences about the moral character of the 
displayer and that is likely to influence the supervisor’s behavior towards the displayer in 
particular (See Figure 1). This is in line with prior theoretical arguments conceptualizing ethical 
leadership as a social learning process (Brown et al., 2005; Brown & Treviño, 2006), that is, 
followers can impact attitudes, values and behaviors of their leaders. Specifically, by observing 
an exceptional follower’s (i.e., model’s) behavior, the leader may come “to identify with the 
model, internalize the model’s values and attitudes, and emulate the modeled behavior” (Brown 
& Treviño, 2006). Theoretically, this is an important distinction we make because the literature 
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on moral awareness does not differentiate between the behavior towards the displayer and any 
other subordinate, while our argument proposes that displaying moral symbols will prevent the 
superior from asking the displayer, in particular, to engage in unethical behavior. As noted, we 
suggest that the use of moral symbols by a follower can elicit inferences about the high moral 
character of that follower in addition to increasing moral awareness and thus, the follower can 
serve as a form of social influence to guide the leader’s behavior and reduce the occurrence of 
unethical acts in the workplace in addition to shielding herself/himself from unethical requests.  
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
Generally, people are known to make social judgments about others based on the objects 
they buy and own, the clothes they wear, the type of furnishings they have, the kind of music 
they listen to, and so on (e.g., Belk, 1988; Elsbach, 2004). In other words, various objects and 
abstract ideas owned and displayed by a person signal to others how important a particular 
identity associated with these symbols are to that person’s overall self-concept (Gollwitzer, 
1986; Laughlin, 1970). In the workplace, people make inferences about their coworkers, 
subordinates, and bosses, based on cues such as how the office is laid out, how personalized the 
space is, how cluttered the desk is, what their signature looks like, and so forth (Elsbach, 2003, 
2004; Elsbach & Pratt, 2007). Although there are no studies linking the presence of moral 
symbols to inferences about a person’s moral character, researchers have found that organized 
desks, good lighting, cheerful décor, and the presence of books lead observers to infer that the 
occupant is conscientious, and unwilling to bend the rules (Gosling, Jin Ko, Mannarelli, & 
Morris, 2002). It is therefore reasonable to assume that moral symbols such as religious objects 
and quotations regarding honor at the bottom of emails may also lead observers to form 
impressions about a person’s moral character, behavior, and ethical preferences.  
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Moral symbols might lead bosses to infer that the subordinate displaying the symbol has 
high ethical standards; thus, even if the boss chooses to engage in unethical acts, he/she may 
require a subordinate other than the one perceived as high moral character to perform the 
unethical tasks. Indeed, according to the moral foundations theory, people have an intuitive 
desire to venerate and cherish purity and protect from desecration the symbols that signify purity 
(Graham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, Koleva, & Ditto, 2011). Literature stemming from cultural 
anthropology as well as social psychology suggests that people intuitively consider it immoral to 
defile pure objects or beings such as harming the innocence of children or disrespecting moral 
exemplars (Gino & Desai, 2012; Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987; Shweder & Much, 1991). 
Often, such desecration evokes feelings of moral disgust. As such, it might be perceived as an 
added layer of moral violation to issue an unethical directive to an employee perceived as having 
high moral character. Thus superiors may feel uncomfortable issuing an unethical directive to a 
subordinate displaying moral symbols because of perceived high levels of moral character.  
Additionally, issuing unethical directives to a person with high moral character may 
induce feelings of moral accountability towards that person. Accountability is defined as the 
anticipation of being evaluated, of being required to justify one’s beliefs or actions to another 
individual, or the apprehension of being judged (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). Importantly, such 
expectations need not necessarily be explicit; they can comprise of implicit feelings that one 
might be judged for the choices one makes or the way one behaves (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). It 
is possible that when superiors form moral attributions regarding a subordinate due to exposure 
to moral symbols, they likely imagine how such an ethical employee would judge them if he or 
she were to find out how unethical the request was. Previous work has demonstrated that 
accountability modifies thought processes such that people become more critical of their future 
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actions (Desai & Kouchaki, 2015; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). Thus, feelings of accountability may 
make unethical superiors avoid issuing the directive to an employee perceived as high moral 
character. 
Furthermore, there may be a concern that a subordinate with high moral character may 
follow his/her internal moral principles and choose not to comply with the unethical request. 
Such disobedience could either take the form of not following the instructions or, possibly, 
motivating the subordinate to complain to higher authorities regarding the unethical nature of the 
task assigned or even blow the whistle. As such, superiors may avoid issuing unethical directives 
to a subordinate high in moral character. In sum, there are various reasons why being exposed to 
a moral symbol and inferring that a subordinate has high moral character might dissuade 
superiors from issuing unethical directives to that particular subordinate.  
Hypothesis 3:  By exposing a superior to moral symbols, a subordinate will have a better 
chance of preventing the superior from asking him/her (i.e., the subordinate displaying 
the moral symbol) to engage in unethical behavior.  
Hypothesis 4:  Perceived high moral character of the subordinate displaying moral 
symbols mediates the relationship between display of such symbols and the likelihood of 
the superior asking the displayer to engage in unethical behavior.  
  In sum, by displaying moral symbols, subordinates can reduce their superiors’ unethical 
behavior and discourage their supervisors from instructing them, especially, to engage in 
unethical acts.  
OVERVIEW OF STUDIES 
We conducted six studies—five laboratory studies and a survey study of subordinate-
supervisor dyads—to test our theory. First, in Studies 1 and 2, we tested the effect of display of 
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different moral symbols on leaders’ moral behavior and their choice of subordinate. In Study 3, 
we examined if moral symbols prevent only unethical requests or any request directed at the 
displayer. In Study 4, we examined if exposure to moral symbols reduces unethical behavior of 
bosses and if moral awareness mediates this effect. In Study 5, we used a simulation involving 
organizational decision-making to further test the effect of display of moral symbols on leaders’ 
moral behavior and their choice of subordinate, and also examine the mediating role of perceived 
moral character in averting unethical requests directed at the displayer. In Study 6, we tested our 
hypotheses with data from a survey of subordinate-supervisor dyads in India using pictures of 
gods and other religious icons as examples of moral symbols frequently used in workplace in 
that culture.   
STUDY 1 
In Study 1, we test Hypotheses 1 (overall unethical behaviors) and 3 (likelihood of the 
superior asking the subordinate displaying the moral symbol to engage in unethical act) using a 
measure of dishonesty, namely, the deception game (Gneezy, 2005). Additionally, we used a 
post-experimental questionnaire as part of the debriefing to assess participants’ suspicion and 
examine what they think the purpose of the study was, or what was their impression of the 
situation depicted in the study. 
Methods   
Sample and Design. One hundred and forty-eight college students (81 men, Mage = 
20.64, SD = 3.18) from a university in United States participated in this study for pay. In addition 
to participation payment, participants had the opportunity to earn $4 or $9 based on the outcome 
of an economic game. The study employed a 2 condition (Moral symbol: present vs. absent) 
between subjects design. 
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Procedure. Participants were informed that as part of a study on decision-making in 
virtual teams, they would be paired with two other participants to form a virtual team to jointly 
play the role of Team 1. They were further told they would receive introductory emails from 
their team members and would respond to them using a messaging system internal to the 
experiment. Additionally, one member of each virtual team would be assigned to the role of 
“team leader.”  
All participants were then assigned to play the role of their team’s leader. The other two 
“members” were fictitious people, Pat and Sam, who would send short emails to the team leader 
briefly introducing themselves as members 2 and 3. At the bottom of the introductory email sent 
to the team leader, Pat’s email either included a moral quote (“Better to fail with honor than 
succeed by fraud”) or there was no quote to serve as a moral symbol.  
Next, participants played a modified version of a deception game (Gneezy, 2005) in 
which they had an opportunity to deceive their opponent team. However, we did not allude to 
any ethics-related words and told participants that they would simply play a game with another 
team. Specifically, they were then given the following instructions: 
“In this game, your team (Team 1) and the other team (Team 2) will initially be given 
$30 each. At the end of the game, two monetary payments are possible. The payments for 
Team 1 and Team 2 will depend on the payment option that Team 2 chooses. Team 2 will 
be given two payment options to choose from, but only the leader of Team 1 will know 
the actual amounts of each payment option. Here is an example of the information that 
might be available to the leader of Team 1: 
 
Sample Payment Option A: If this option is chosen, Team 1 will lose $1 and Team 2 will 
lose $4. 
Sample Payment Option B: If this option is chosen, Team 1 will lose $4 and Team 2 will 
lose $1. 
 
The leader of Team 1 will ask one of the members on the team to communicate to Team 
2 one of the following messages: 
 
Sample Message 1: Payment option A will result in the most money for you (i.e., Team 2). 
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Sample Message 2: Payment option B will result in the most money for you (i.e., Team 2). 
 
Team 2 will then decide which payment option to choose, and based on Team 2’s 
decision, Team 1 and Team 2 will receive the dollar amounts specified in the payment 
option chosen and the money will be divided equally between team members. At no time 
Team 2 will know the values of the different payment options or how much money Team 
1 received in the end as a consequence of the payment option chosen by Team 2. At the 
end of the experiment, each team’s payment will be divided equally between its 
members.” 
 
Note that participants were informed that only they, as the leader of Team 1, would be 
privy to the dollar amounts contained in payment options A and B; rest of their team (Sam and 
Pat) would not have access to this information. Moreover, after deciding which message to send 
to Team 2, the leader would select either Pat or Sam to communicate the message to Team 2.  
The two actual payment options presented to the participants were: 
Payment option A: If this option is chosen, Team 1 will lose $18 and Team 2 will lose $3. 
Payment option B: If this option is chosen, Team 1 will lose $3 and Team 2 will lose $18. 
 
The leader of Team 1 (the participant) then had to decide whether to send the other team 
an honest message (i.e., Message 1) or a deceptive message (i.e., Message 2) by one of his/her 
team members (Pat or Sam). Sending the truthful message would likely cause their team to lose 
$18; lying and sending the deceptive message would likely cause their team to lose only $3. 
Thus, there was a clear financial incentive to lie. 
Note that the way the study was set up, the leader knew that the subordinate 
communicating the message would have no way of knowing whether the message he/she was 
asked to communicate was honest or not, and thus, irrespective of the decision they (the leaders) 
made, the leaders’ moral reputation would be intact. Lastly, note that the experimental design 
incorporated a “loss frame,” that is the two options A and B were framed as resulting in a loss of 
$18 or $3, as opposed to a gain of $12 or $27. Loss frames have been shown to increase 
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unethical behavior (e.g., Kern & Chugh, 2009), and thus, using a loss frame provided a more 
conservative test of the effectiveness of moral symbols.  
After choosing one of the messages to be communicated and the person to communicate 
the message, participants were asked to respond to a few questions designed to examine if 
participants were aware of the purpose of the exercise, i.e., whether the manipulation was having 
a non-conscious effect on behavior (Shantz & Latham, 2009): (i) What do you think is the 
purpose of the experiment? (ii) What do you think the experiment was trying to uncover? (iii) 
Did you think any of the emails influenced your decisions? (iv) If so, how? and (v) Did anything 
in the instruction packet affect what you did? An examination of participants’ responses to the 
post-experimental questionnaire reveals that none of the participants expressed any suspicion or 
correctly identified the study’s hypotheses. They claimed that their decision making was their 
own and uninfluenced by any situational cues. In other words, even though some participants 
may have registered the presence of a moral symbol, they were unaware of its effects on their 
cognition and behavior. 
Results and Discussion  
Reduction in overall unethical behavior. First, we examined if exposure to a moral 
symbol led to decreases in overall unethical behavior in the form of lower incidence of 
communication of the deceptive message. Indeed, the percentage of participants who chose to 
communicate the deceptive message to the opposing team varied based on whether they had been 
exposed to a moral symbol, χ2 (1, 148) = 4.61, p < .05. In the control condition, 63.5 percent of 
participants (47 out of 74) chose to communicate a deceptive message. This percentage was 
significantly lower in the moral symbol condition, in which 45.9 percent of participants (34 out 
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of 74) chose to communicate a deceptive message. In other words, the display of a moral symbol 
reduced the overall instances of unethical behavior of the leader, thus supporting Hypothesis 1. 
Protection for displayer of the moral symbol.  To examine whether a moral symbol 
protected the individual displaying the symbol, that is, whether those team leaders who decided 
to engage in deceptive behavior were less likely to ask Pat (the team member who displayed the 
moral symbol) to communicate the untruthful message, we examined the subset of leaders who 
selected the deceptive message. Indeed, among those who decided to communicate a deceptive 
message, exposure to the moral symbol had a significant effect on whether they chose Pat (with 
moral symbol) or Sam (no moral symbol) to deliver the message, χ2(1, 81) = 8.19, p < .01. In the 
control condition, 55.3 percent of participants (26 out of 47) asked Pat to communicate the 
deceptive message. This percentage was significantly lower in the moral symbol condition, in 
which only 23.5 percent of participants (8 out of 34) asked Pat to communicate the deceptive 
message. In other words, exposing a leader to moral symbols did prevent the superior 
specifically from asking the displayer to carry out the unethical action if they chose to do so, 
thereby supporting Hypothesis 3.  
As noted above, an examination of participants’ responses to the post-experimental 
questionnaire did not reveal any awareness of the purpose of the experiment. This observation 
coupled with the rest of the findings suggest that indeed, displaying moral symbols serves as a 
necklace of garlic and prevents those in authority from asking the particular subordinate to 
execute unethical tasks even if they (the superiors) choose to engage in unethical acts.   
As shown, unethical leaders chose not to ask Pat to convey the dishonest message to the 
other team. Remember that in this study the leader knew that the subordinate communicating the 
message would not know whether the message he/she was asked to communicate was honest or 
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not and their moral reputation would be intact. In other words, the experimental design made it 
easy for leaders to behave unethically and yet, those in the experimental condition were less 
likely to ask their subordinate to communicate the deceptive message. These results suggest that 
there might be a psychological disincentive associated with asking a person perceived to be 
ethical to carry out an unethical directive.  
STUDY 2 
In Study 1 we used a moral quote as the example of moral symbols. The purpose of Study 
2 was to examine the generalizability of the results obtained in previous study by using a 
different manipulation of moral symbol, namely a T-shirt advertising a website, 
“YourMorals.Org” (experimental condition) or “YourMoney.Com” (control condition).  
Methods   
Sample and Design. We recruited one hundred and twenty eight individuals from United 
States to participate in an online study through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk website (MTurk). 
Ten individuals who failed to follow instructions, failed attention checks, or did not respond to 
questions regarding the study variables of interest were excluded from analyses. The final sample 
consisted of 118 participants (53 men, Mage = 33.9, SD = 11.4). The study employed a 2 
condition (Moral symbol: present vs. absent) between subjects design.   
Procedure. Participants were informed that they would participate in a study examining 
virtual interactions. As part of the study they would choose avatars, that is, icons or figures 
representing a particular person in the digital world such as internet forums. First, they were 
asked to create their own avatars by specifying details such as gender, hair color, clothes, and so 
forth. They had numerous options to choose from for the various categories, including T-shirts. 
Note that they had to choose amongst T-shirts that had “StateFarm.com”, “MetLife.com”, 
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“Geico.com” and so forth printed on them2. The cover story for using these labels was that the 
study was sponsored by these companies. Next, they were informed that as part of a study on 
decision-making in virtual teams, they would be paired with two other participants to form a 
virtual team to jointly play the role of Team 1. They were further told they would view the 
avatars of their team members and would communicate with them using a messaging system 
internal to the study. Additionally, one member of each virtual team would be assigned to the 
role of “team leader.”  
All participants were then assigned to play the role of their team’s leader. The other two 
“members” were fictitious people, Pat and Sam, whose avatars were displayed to the team leader 
as members 2 and 3. Pat’s avatar wore a T-shirt that either advertised a website called 
“YourMorals.Org” (experimental condition) or “YourMoney.Com” (control condition). Sam’s 
avatar wore a T-shirt that advertised “ChillPill.Com” in both conditions.  
Next, participants played the same decision making game as in Study 1 in which they had 
an opportunity to deceive the opposing team by sending a dishonest message, and had to decide 
whether Pat or Sam would communicate the message.  
Results and Discussion  
Reduction in overall unethical behavior. First, we examined if exposure to a moral 
symbol led to decreases in overall unethical behavior in the form of lower incidence of 
communication of the deceptive message. Indeed, the percentage of participants who chose to 
communicate the deceptive message to the opposing team varied based on the exposure to moral 
symbol manipulation, χ2 (1, 118) = 4.88, p < .05. In the control condition, 60.3 percent of 
participants (35 out of 59) chose to communicate a deceptive message. This percentage was 
                                                 
2 However, none of the T-shirts presented to them had “YourMoney.org” or “YourMorals.org” printed on them. 
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significantly lower in the moral symbol condition, in which 39.0 percent of participants (23 out 
of 59) chose to communicate a deceptive message. In other words, the display of a moral symbol 
reduced the unethical behavior of the leader, further supporting Hypothesis 1. 
Protection for displayer of the moral symbol.  To examine whether the moral symbol 
protected the individual displaying the symbol, that is, whether those team leaders who decided 
to engage in deceptive behavior were less likely to ask Pat (the team member who displayed the 
moral symbol) to communicate the untruthful message, we examined the subset of leaders who 
selected the deceptive message. Among those who decided to communicate a deceptive message, 
exposure to the moral symbol had a significant effect on whether they chose Pat (with moral 
symbol) or Sam (no moral symbol) to deliver the message, χ2(1, 58) = 4.50, p < .05. In the 
control condition, 54.3 percent of participants (19 out of 35) asked Pat to communicate the 
deceptive message. This percentage was significantly lower in the moral symbol condition, in 
which only 24.0 percent of participants (6 out of 23) asked Pat to communicate the deceptive 
message. In sum, exposing a leader to moral symbols did prevent the superior specifically from 
asking the displayer to carry out the unethical action if they chose to do so, (Hypothesis 3).  
STUDY 3 
Thus far, we have examined the effect of moral symbols in discouraging superiors from 
asking subordinates to do something unethical. Yet, it is still unclear whether the display of 
moral symbols makes leaders less likely to make unethical requests of the moral symbol 
displayer, or less likely to make any kind of request. In other words, might the garlic necklace 
simply be keeping the manager away such that they would avoid the subordinate even for 
ordinary tasks without ethical implications? To further explore this question, we conducted a 
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study in which we examined if moral symbols prevented superiors from asking the displayer to 
engage in a task if it was unethical, or even if it was a neutral task.  
Methods   
Sample and Design. We recruited two hundred and ten individuals from United States to 
participate in an online study through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk website (MTurk). Three 
individuals who failed to follow instructions, failed attention checks, or did not respond to 
questions regarding the study variables of interest were excluded from analyses. The final sample 
consisted of 207 participants (98 men; Mage = 35.9 years, SD = 12.6). The study employed a 2 
(Moral symbol: present vs. absent) by 2 (Domain: ethical dilemma vs. no dilemma) between 
subjects design.  
Procedure. Similar to Studies 1-2, participants were informed that they were taking part 
in a study on decision-making in virtual teams in which they would be paired with two other 
participants to form a virtual team to jointly play the role of Team 1. Participants received 
introductory emails from two fictitious team members (Zoya and Masha) and were assigned to 
play the role of their team’s leader. At the bottom of the introductory email sent to the team 
leader, Zoya’s email either included the moral quote used in Study 1 (“Better to fail with honor 
than succeed by fraud”)  or there was a neutral quote, “Success and luck go hand in hand.” 3  
Next, participants played a game (Gneezy, 2005) in which they had an opportunity to 
communicate with their opponent team and possibly deceive them. However, based on random 
assignment, participants either were assigned to play a game involving an ethical dilemma (i.e., 
                                                 
3 We ran a pilot study with a separate group of participants (n=50) with a within participant design and asked 
everyone to rate the two quote on a number of characteristics in a random order on a 7-point Likert scale ranging 
from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 7 (extremely). The results confirmed that people rated the moral quote as more 
moral (M = 6.16, SD = 1.03) and virtuous (M = 5.98, SD = 1.19) than the neutral quote (M = 3.71, SD = 1.54; M = 
3.73, SD = 1.48), both p < .001. Importantly the neutral quote was rated as more neutral (M = 4.88, SD = 1.62) and 
unemotional (M = 4.63, SD = 1.44) than moral quote (M = 2.92, SD = 1.49; M = 4.63, SD = 1.44), both p < .001. 
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the deception game where it was profitable to lie), or a neutral game in which the two payment 
options yielded identical payoffs to the two teams (i.e., where there was no dilemma involved). 
Specifically, the two payment options presented to the participants in the ethical dilemma 
condition were: 
Payment option A: If this option is chosen, Team 1 will gain 75 cents and Team 2 will gain 
15 cents. 
Payment option B: If this option is chosen, Team 1 will gain 15 cents and Team 2 will gain 
75 cents. 
 
And, the two payment options presented to the participants in the no dilemma condition 
were: 
Payment option A: If this option is chosen, Team 1 will gain 15 cents and Team 2 will gain 
15 cents. 
Payment option B: If this option is chosen, Team 1 will gain 75 cents and Team 2 will gain 
75 cents 
 
The leader of Team 1 (the participant) then had to decide whether to send the other team 
a message communicating that Option A would yield a better outcome to the opponent (i.e., 
Message 1) or that Option B would yield superior outcome (i.e., Message 2) by one of his/her 
team members (Zoya or Masha). In the ethical dilemma condition, there was a clear financial 
incentive to lie whereas in the no dilemma condition, there was no conflict between ethics and 
financial incentives. Note that in this study we used a different set of names (Zoya and Masha) to 
test our hypotheses to ensure the observed effects in prior studies are not driven by the names 
chosen (Pat and Sam).    
Results and Discussion  
To examine whether displaying the moral symbol caused the leader to treat the displayer 
any different from the non-displayer, we first examined the no-dilemma condition. In the no-
dilemma condition, all participants communicated the message that maximized both teams’ 
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payoff, i.e., Message 2. Exposure to the moral symbol had no effect on whether they chose Zoya 
(who displayed a moral symbol) or Masha (who displayed no moral symbol) to deliver the 
message, χ2(1, 102) = 0.13, n.s.; 58 percent of participants (29 out of 50) asked Zoya to 
communicate the message in the control condition whereas 61.5 percent (32 out of 52) asked her 
in the moral symbol condition.   
Reduction in overall unethical behavior. In the ethical dilemma condition, 44.8 
percentage communicated the deceptive message that maximized their team’s payoff, i.e., 
Message 1. Exposure to the moral symbol had a main effect on whether participants selected the 
deceptive message, χ2(1, 105) = 5.05, p < .05; 55.8 percent of participants (29 out of 52) selected 
the unethical message in the control condition whereas only 34 percent (18 out of 53) selected 
the unethical message in the moral symbol condition.  
Protection for displayer of the moral symbol.  We examined whether those team 
leaders who decided to engage in deceptive behavior were less likely to ask Zoya to 
communicate the untruthful message when she displayed the moral symbol. We looked at the 
subset of leaders who selected the deceptive message. Indeed, among those who decided to 
communicate a deceptive message, exposure to the moral symbol had a significant effect on 
whether they chose Zoya (with moral symbol) or Masha (no moral symbol) to deliver the 
message, χ2(1, 47) = 5.72, p < . 05. In the control condition, 51.7 percent of participants (15 out 
of 29) asked Zoya to communicate the deceptive message. This percentage was significantly 
lower in the moral symbol condition, in which only 16.7 percent of participants (3 out of 18) 
asked Zoya to communicate the deceptive message. In other words, exposing a leader to moral 
symbols did prevent the superior specifically from asking the displayer to carry out the unethical 
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action if they chose to do so in the ethical dilemma condition, however, the moral symbol did not 
impact the superior’s choices in the no moral dilemma condition.  
STUDY 4 
Study 4 tests the underlying mechanism, moral awareness, responsible for the effect of 
exposure to moral symbols on reduction in unethical behavior (Hypotheses 1-2). Additionally, 
we investigate whether displaying moral symbols may have hidden backlash effects such that the 
superior may avoid the moral symbol displayer and may view such subordinate as an undesirable 
person to socialize with. To this end, we also measured possible backlash effects against those 
who display moral symbols. 
Methods   
Sample and Design. One hundred and forty participants were recruited from a 
nationwide database maintained by a university in United States. Eighteen individuals who failed 
to follow instructions, failed attention checks, or did not respond to questions regarding the study 
variables of interest were excluded from analyses. The final sample consisted of 122 participants 
(38 men, Mage = 33.7, SD = 11.4). The study employed a 2 condition (Moral symbol: present vs. 
absent) between subjects design. 
Procedure. Participants engaged in a decision making task adapted from Schweitzer, 
DeChurch, and Gibson (2005) and also used by Pitesa and Thau (2013). This task is based on the 
principles of the prisoner’s dilemma. All participants were assigned to the same role, which 
described how they had been promoted to an important division of a tours company. In order to 
make profits, it was important for the company to maximize the number of its tours. However, a 
competitor was operating in the same location and if both companies continued to increase the 
number of tours, the location would soon become less exotic and lose its appeal with tourists, 
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thereby driving down future revenue. Further, participants were informed that they had just 
received an e-mail from one of their subordinates, Pat Anderson, sending them the numbers they 
requested about the decision at hand. They further read that their competitor had offered to match 
the number of tours that Roving Tours (i.e., the participant’s company) would disclose to them. 
So, trying to minimize the number of tours run by the competitor by pretending that they would 
run only a few tours, but conducting more runs in actuality would lead to a higher payoff for 
their company. In other words, as with any prisoner’s dilemma, the company could defect from 
the original number of stated tours to make more profit. The participant, in the role of the 
protagonist, had to decide what number of tours to directly communicate to the other team and 
decide privately what number to actually execute.  
Based on random assignment, participants were exposed to either a moral quote or 
neutral quote at the bottom of their subordinate’s email. In the moral symbol condition, 
participants saw the moral quote, “Better to fail with honor than succeed by fraud.” In the control 
condition, they saw the neutral quote, “Success and luck go hand in hand.” Participants were 
informed that their company typically schedules between 1 to 7 tours for dry seasons. Next, 
participants indicated the number of tours that their company would actually run the following 
season, and, how many tours they would report to their competitor that they intend to run. The 
variable of interest was the difference between actual and stated number of tours, an act of 
purposeful deception and therefore an unethical decision. Note that the subordinate, Pat, was not 
part of the decision making nor part of the communication with the competitor company, and the 
participants would communicate the deceptive message themselves and their subordinate would 
not know whether the communication was honest or deceptive.  
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We measured moral awareness with the three items (α = .82) from Reynolds (2006). A 
sample item was “The situation I was in clearly had some moral aspects to it.” Responses were coded 
on a scale from 1 (“Strongly disagree”) to 7 (“Strongly agree”).  
Additionally, we measured potential backlash against the subordinate, Pat, with six items (α 
= .94) adapted from Amanatullah and Tinsley (2013). Sample items are “How interested would you 
be in working with Pat?” “If you were the project manager on a work assignment, how likely would 
you be to ask Pat to be part of the project team?” and “How interested would you be in interacting 
socially with Pat?” Responses varied on a scale from 1 (“Not at all”) to 7 (“Extremely”).  
Results and Discussion  
Reduction in overall unethical behavior. We compared both the percentage of liars and 
the average lying (the difference between the reported tours and the actual numbers of tours 
intended to run) between conditions. First, we examined if exposure to a moral symbol led to a 
lower incidence of deceiving the competitor. Indeed, the percentage of participants who chose to 
misrepresent the number of tours varied based on whether they had been exposed to a moral 
symbol, χ2 (1, 122) = 3.05, p < .10. In the control condition with neutral quote, 35.4 percent of 
participants (23 out of 65) chose to misrepresent themselves to their business competitor. This 
percentage was marginally significantly lower in the moral symbol condition, in which 21.1 
percent of participants (12 out of 57) chose to engage in deception. So, the display of moral 
symbols reduced the unethical behavior of the leader overall. 
Next, we examined whether exposure to the moral symbol influenced the extent of 
deception by examining the difference between the number of tours that participants claimed 
they would run and the number they intended to run. We conducted a linear regression with 
extent of deception as the dependent variable and exposure to moral symbol as the independent 
variable, F(1,121)=4.01, p<.05.  The average amount of deception was lower among participants 
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exposed to the moral symbol (M= .30, SD =.71) compared to those in the control condition 
(M=.66, SD =1.13). In brief, the analyses with both measures provide preliminary support for 
Hypothesis 1.  
Moral awareness. We found that exposure to the moral symbol influenced reported 
moral awareness, F (1,121) = 7.13, p < .05. Specifically, exposure to the moral symbol led to 
higher moral awareness among participants (M = 5.60, SD = 1.04) than those exposed to the 
neutral quote (M = 5.03, SD = 1.29).  
Mediation by moral awareness. To test whether moral awareness mediated the effect of 
the display of moral symbols on the likelihood of superiors’ unethical behavior we used the 
bootstrapping approach outlined by Preacher and Hayes (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). Results of 
the bootstrapping analysis (with 5000 iterations) revealed that display of moral symbols had a 
statistically significant effect on moral awareness (B = .57, p < .01), which in turn significantly 
affected the extent of unethical behaviors (B = -.22, p < .01). Indeed, the effect of moral symbols 
was reduced (from B = -.36, p <.05, to B = -.24, n.s.) when moral awareness was included in the 
model. The bootstrap analysis offered support for Hypothesis 2 by demonstrating that the 95% 
bias-corrected confidence interval for the size of the indirect effect excluded zero (-.29, -.04). 
Running the analyses with the percentage of deceivers showed the same pattern with the 95% 
bias-corrected confidence interval for the size of the indirect effect excluding zero (-.74, -.08).   
Backlash against displayer of moral symbol. There was no significant difference 
between conditions on backlash (Mmoral = 4.78, SD = 1.42 vs. Mneutral = 4.72, SD = 1.26), 
F(1,121)=.05, n.s. This suggests that superiors do not avoid the moral symbol displayer and view 
such subordinate as desirable as another subordinate.  
STUDY 5 
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The purpose of Study 5 was to use a simulation involving organizational decision-making 
and also to examine the role of inferences about the moral character of subordinates.  
Methods   
Sample and Design. Sixty-eight college students (40 men, Mage = 20.75, SD = 1.67) were 
recruited from United States to take part in this study for pay. The study employed a 2 condition 
(Moral symbol: present vs. absent) between subjects design.   
Procedure. Participants were informed that they would participate in a simulation 
examining decision-making. The simulation task that they were asked to complete was adopted 
from an “in-basket exercise” developed by Brief, Dukerich, Brown, and Brett (1996). In this 
simulation, participants played the role of “Drew Meyer,” the Joint-President of a software 
company called Silika, and contender for promotion to President. The role was designed such 
that Drew had authority over two senior vice presidents, Pat and Sam, in addition to other 
organizational members.     
The simulation presented participants with background information about the company 
and their role, and required them to respond to emails in their inbox. Based on random 
assignment, participants were exposed to either a moral quote or neutral quote from one of their 
subordinates. While responding to their inbox, in the moral symbol condition, participants saw 
an email from Pat with the same moral quote used in previous studies, “Better to fail with honor 
than succeed by fraud.” In the control condition, they saw the quote, “Success and luck go hand 
in hand.” Participants viewed multiple emails and to avoid order effects, these emails were 
presented in a randomized order such that some participants saw an email from Sam first while 
others saw Pat’s email first. 
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 Participants were presented with several filler emails after which they read a 
memorandum in which Drew Meyer (their role) were presented with an opportunity to ask either 
of the subordinates, Pat or Sam, to fraudulently report the company’s finances and show a profit. 
Reporting fraudulent finances not only would materially increase the firm’s profits for the year 
and increase Drew’s chances of making President, but also ensure that all organizational 
members received year-end bonuses. However, it was an unethical choice4. Participants then 
chose one of the options (to report the fraudulent finances or not) and decided who would carry 
out their request. Afterwards, they responded to some filler emails.  
Next, participants were presented with 3 statements regarding Pat’s and Sam’s moral 
character respectively and asked to state their agreement with the statements on a scale of 1 (not 
at all true) to 5 (very true). Items included, “Pat/Sam is ethical,” “Pat/Sam is moral,” and 
“Pat/Sam does not live by his/her principles” [reverse coded] (α = .72).  
Results and Discussion  
Reduction in overall unethical behavior. We examined if exposure to a moral symbol 
led to reduction in overall unethical behavior (i.e., a lower incidence of sending the email to ask 
for fraudulent reporting of finances). We found that the percentage of participants who chose to 
send the email for deceptive accounting varied based on whether they had been exposed to a 
moral symbol, χ2 (1, 68) = 9.95, p < .01. In the control condition with neutral quote, 67.6 percent 
of participants (23 out of 34) chose to engage in fraudulent reporting of finances. This percentage 
was significantly lower in the moral symbol condition, in which 29.4 percent of participants (10 
                                                 
4 A pilot study with a separate group of participants (n=58) confirmed that people judged reporting fraudulent 
accounts as less ethical (M = 1.63, SD = .93) than correcting the fraudulent report (M = 4.25, SD = .65), F(1, 57) = 
153.33, p<001. 
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out of 34) chose to engage in deceptive accounting. So, the display of moral symbols reduced the 
unethical behavior of the leader overall, thus supporting Hypothesis 1. 
Protection for displayer of moral symbols. To examine whether the moral symbol 
served as a protection mechanism for those displaying the symbols, once again, we examined the 
subset of participants who chose the unethical act. Indeed, among leaders who decided to behave 
unethically, exposure to the moral symbol had a significant effect on whether they chose Pat 
(subordinate displaying the moral symbol) or Sam (no moral symbol) to fraudulently report the 
company’s finances, χ2 (1, 33) = 2.22, p < .05. In the control condition, 70 percent of 
participants (16 out of 23) asked Pat to carry out their unethical directive. This percentage was 
significantly lower in the moral symbol condition, in which 20 percent of participants (2 out of 
10) asked Pat to fraudulently report the company’s finances. So, exposing a leader to moral 
symbols did prevent the superior specifically from asking the displayer of a moral symbol to 
engage in unethical acts. 
Perceived moral character of displayer of moral symbol5. We found that exposure to a 
moral symbol influenced people’s perception of moral character of the displayer, F (1,67) = 
13.22, p < .05. Specifically, display of a moral symbol led participants to judge Pat to be more 
ethical (M = 3.91, SD = 0.71) than those who saw a neutral quote (M = 3.24, SD = 0.82) 6. 
                                                 
5 We intended to test Hypothesis 3 (mediation hypothesis) in this study, however given the low number of 
participants, who chose Pat to engage in unethical behavior (n=2), the numbers are too low to appropriately test 
mediation, therefore, we do not present the mediation analyses in results section. However, using the bootstrapping 
approach outlined by Preacher and Hayes (Preacher & Hayes, 2004), results revealed that display of moral symbol 
had a statistically significant effect on perceived morality of Pat (B = .68, p < .001), which in turn significantly 
affected the choice to ask Pat to carry the unethical order (B = -2.21, p < .05). Indeed, the effect of our manipulation 
was reduced (from B = 1.61, p <.01, to B = 1.07, p < .10) when perceived morality of Pat was included in the 
equation. The 95% bias-corrected confidence interval for the size of the indirect effect excluded zero (.21, 2.25), 
suggesting that the perceived morality of the person displaying the moral symbol mediated the effect of moral 
symbol display on the likelihood of superior asking the displayer to engage in unethical behavior. 
6 A pilot study with a separate group of participants (n=37) who did not complete the ethical decision making task 
and saw a neutral version of the task confirmed that people evaluated Pat as being more ethical in the experimental 
condition (M = 3.90, SD = .70) than in the control condition, i.e., email with a neutral quote (M = 3.30, SD = .96), 
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However, Pat’s display of a moral symbol had no effect on the perceived moral character of 
Sam, F (1, 67) = 2.32, n.s.  
The results of Study 5 thus provide further support for the hypothesized effect of moral 
symbols, and in particular, in regard to the displayer. Additionally, this study provides some 
preliminary evidence in support of our argument for the effect of the inferences about the moral 
character of displayer of moral symbol on decisions.  
STUDY 6 
Thus far, we examined the effect of moral symbols in controlled experimental studies in 
which participants were exposed to a moral symbol momentarily and then interacted with the 
displayer. However, the validity of these findings and effectiveness of moral symbols would be 
enhanced more by testing the hypotheses in a field setting ripe with competing cues, conflicting 
goals, and high stakes. To this end, we examined if the results obtained in previous studies may 
be obtained in a real setting with subordinates and supervisors. We collected data from 
subordinate–supervisor dyads in which subordinates reported the criterion variable – unethical 
request– and the supervisors reported the predictor variable – exposure to moral symbols – to 
reduce common methods bias. 
The additional organizational data with subordinate–supervisor dyads also help us 
demonstrate that our proposed effect results from perceived high moral character of the 
subordinate. Furthermore, this study provides a fertile ground to study if moral symbols would 
work despite the obvious power asymmetries in the real world.  
Another advantage of this study is that we investigated the effect of examples of moral 
symbols already in use in business settings in an eastern culture. Specifically, we collected data 
                                                 
F(1, 36) = 4.74, p < .05. Furthermore, participants did not distinguish between Pat and Sam on non-moral attributes 
such as intelligence, competence, etc. 
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in India in which pictures of gods and other religious icons as examples of moral symbols are 
frequently used in workplace. Prior literature has supported the idea that in most cultures and 
societies religious symbols are seen as moral symbols. For example, to prime morality, prior 
research has widely used religious reminders such as the Ten Commandments (e.g., Mazar et al., 
2008). Mazar and colleagues note that “the idea of the Ten Commandments recall task was that 
independent of people’s religion, of whether people believed in God, or of whether they knew 
any of the commandments, knowing that the Ten Commandments are about moral rules would 
be enough to increase attention to their own moral standards and thus increase the likelihood of 
behavior consistent with these standards” (p. 635). It is important to note that we did not equate 
religious symbols with moral symbols, rather argue that in most cultures and contexts, religious 
symbols could be perceived as moral symbols. 
Methods   
Data were collected from surveys administered to both employees and their supervisors 
in a variety of organizations in India. Business administration students of a business school in 
India approached the organizations and recruited them. In all, we obtained completed data from 
one hundred and four subordinate–supervisor pairs. The sample was drawn from a variety of 
professions, such as the IT sector, accounting, sales, and so forth. Regarding demographic 
characteristics, 63 percent of the employee respondents were male, and the mean age of the 
employee respondents was 31.44 years (SD =9.19). The employee respondents had a mean job 
tenure of 4.39 years (SD = 1.40). Eighty-nine percent of the supervisor respondents were male, 
and the mean age of supervisor respondents was 41.44 years (SD = 6.08). The supervisors had a 
job tenure of 6.61 years (SD = 1.2). Moreover, they had interacted with their subordinates for an 
average of 3.37 years (SD = 1.08).  
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The supervisor survey contained subordinate’s performance measure, a relationship 
quality measure, a question regarding whether the target employee displays moral symbols, the 
perceived moral character of the employee (counterbalanced), as well as demographic questions. 
The employee survey contained measures related to how frequently the supervisor issues 
unethical directives and how frequently the supervisor stops by their work desk 
(counterbalanced). Subordinates also answered questions regarding their job satisfaction, their 
position and demographic questions.   
Measures 
Unethical requests by supervisor. To measure incidence of unethical requests made by 
the supervisor at work, we used six items on a 7-point scale (1 = never, 7= all the time). 
Subordinates were asked to state their agreement/disagreement with statements about their 
current work, including “My boss asks me to do things that are morally inappropriate,” “My boss 
asks me to do things that make me feel dirty afterwards,” “My boss asks me to look the other 
way while he engages in questionable conduct,” “My boss asks me to do tasks that involve lying 
to others,” “My boss asks me to misrepresent facts to make him/her look good,” and “My boss 
makes me treat some people disrespectfully.” The six items were averaged to form a composite 
score for unethical requests by the superior (α = .93). We conducted a confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) to ensure that this scale had appropriate statistical properties. Results suggested 
that all six items loaded on a single latent factor and the CFA supported the single-factor 
structure of the measure.  
Display of moral symbols. The supervisors responded to a single, dichotomous item 
asking whether their subordinates display pictures of gods or other religious icons (such as 
Krishna, Jesus, Buddha) in their workspace (e.g., on their desks or walls of the cubicle).  
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Perceived moral character of subordinate. The supervisors were asked to state their 
agreement with the three statements on a scale of 1 (not at all true) to 5 (very true). Items 
included, “The subordinate is ethical,” “The subordinate is moral,” and “The subordinate does 
not live by moral principles” [reverse coded] (α = .70).   
Control variables. To eliminate the possibility that unethical requests could be explained 
by variables extraneous to our model, we measured and statistically controlled for other variables 
that seemed likely to influence unethical directives. Specifically, we controlled for the 
subordinate’s and supervisor’s age, gender, and job tenure. We also controlled for supervisor-
subordinate tenure. We measured the degree of the supervisor’s exposure to the moral symbol by 
a single item asking employees to indicate their agreement with the statement “My supervisor 
frequently stops by my work desk” on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). 
Additionally, we measured job satisfaction using a single item that asked employees how they 
felt about their job in general on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all satisfied, 7 = very satisfied) 
(Desai, Sondak, & Diekmann, 2011). Moreover, we measured job performance by asking 
superiors to evaluate their subordinates on three items adopted from Welbourne, Johnson, and 
Erez (1998). These items asked supervisors to assess the quantity, quality, and accuracy of the 
subordinate’s work output on a 7-point scale (1 = very poor, 7 = excellent). The three items were 
averaged to form a composite score for job performance (α = .71). In addition, we measured 
religious affiliation of both the subordinate and supervisor, and created a dummy variable called 
religious dissimilarity that was coded 1 if the dyad members did not belong to the same religion. 
Controlling for religious dissimilarity would help to rule out for confounds based on the 
similarity-attraction effect (Byrne, London & Reeves, 1968). We also created a dummy variable 
called gender dissimilarity that was coded 1 if the dyad members belonged to the same gender 
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categories and 0 for mixed dyads. Lastly, we measured relationship quality between the superior 
and subordinate by using a shortened version of the leader-member-exchange (LMX) scale 
(Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995). Supervisors responded to five items that asked them to assess the 
quality of their relationship with their subordinate on a 7-point scale (1 = very poor, 7 = 
excellent). The five items were averaged to form a composite score for relationship quality (α = 
.80). 
Results 
Descriptive statistics and correlations among study variables are presented in Table 1. As 
noted in the table, 43 percent of subordinates displayed some form of moral symbol. For 
instance, these symbols could be pictures of Krishna, Rama, Buddha, Mahavir, Sai Baba, Jesus, 
Virgin Mary, or even rosary beads for prayers and quotes from the Koran. Importantly, display 
of a moral symbol was positively correlated with perceived moral character of the subordinate 
(r=.42, p<.001) and negatively correlated with unethical requests (r = -.31, p<.01).  
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
Perceived moral character of displayer of moral symbol.  We conducted a regression 
analysis with perceived moral character of displayer as the criterion variable and display of 
moral symbols at work as the predictor variable while including all the control variables. We 
found that exposure to a moral symbol in the form of religious symbols was associated with 
supervisors’ perception of the moral character of the subordinate (beta = .37, p<.001). 
Specifically, display of a moral symbol was related to supervisors’ higher assessments of their 
subordinate’s moral character compared to those with no such displays. 
Protection for displayer of the moral symbols.  To test our hypothesis, we conducted a 
multiple regression analysis predicting unethical requests. We regressed the criterion variable on 
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display of moral symbols at work while including control variables. Hypothesis 3 was supported, 
as unethical requests were negatively related to the display of moral symbols (beta = -.24, p < 
.05) as shown in Model 1 of Table 2. Moreover, male supervisors were less likely to make 
unethical requests (beta = -.22, p < .05), and older subordinates were less likely to be issued 
unethical directives (beta = -.25, p < .01) . Importantly, upon introducing the mediator, perceived 
moral character of the subordinate, the effect of display of moral symbols on unethical requests 
was reduced to non-significance, thereby suggesting mediation (Model 2, Table 2). 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
Mediation by perceived moral character of the displayer. To test whether perceived 
moral character of the displayer mediated the effect of the display of a moral symbol on the 
likelihood of superior issuing unethical directives we used the bootstrapping approach outlined 
by Preacher and Hayes (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). Results of the bootstrapping analysis (with 
5000 iterations) revealed that display of moral symbol had a statistically significant effect on 
perceived moral character of the subordinate (B = .87, p < .01), which in turn significantly 
affected unethical requests by supervisors (B = -.34, p < .01). Indeed, the effect of moral symbols 
was reduced (from B = -.72, p < .05, to B = -.42, n.s.) when perceived moral character of the 
subordinate was included in the equation. The bootstrap analysis offered support for Hypothesis 
4 by demonstrating that the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval for the size of the indirect 
effect excluded zero (-.61, -.03). Note that these results were obtained while controlling for 
religious dissimilarity and its two-way interaction with moral symbol. In other words, even in 
instances where a superior belonged to a different religion, the religious symbols displayed by 
the subordinate altered the superior’s perception about the moral character of the subordinate and 
discouraged them from issuing unethical directives. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION  
In this paper, we examined one possible way employees can influence organizational 
authorities’ ethical behavior and discourage unethical directives—by displaying moral symbols. 
In the studies presented here, the presence of moral symbols did not necessarily provide any 
explicit additional monitoring or clear economic deterrent for behaving unethically, yet the 
exposure discouraged unethical behavior. In the laboratory studies, participants, as the team 
leader, had the opportunity to act unethically themselves or ask a team member to deceive others. 
In each of these studies, the presence of a moral symbol served to reduce the incidence of own 
unethical behavior and unethical directive to others. Our work suggests that exposure to moral 
symbols increases moral awareness, which in turn, reduces unethical behavior. Furthermore, the 
person displaying the moral symbol is perceived to be of high moral character, and thus is less 
likely to be asked to engage in unethical behavior. The consistency of findings across our 
experimental studies and the organizational survey provides robust support for our theory.  
Theoretical and Practical Implications 
This research makes several contributions to the literature on ethical decision-making.  
First, the present work extends previous research in behavioral ethics in organizations by 
focusing on a bottom up perspective to examine how employees may influence superiors. 
Existing research in this field for the most part has taken a top down perspective and examined 
how organizational authorities can influence employees (e.g., Palmer, 2008; Schaubroeck et al., 
2012; Treviño & Brown, 2004). For example, the primary focus of the ethical leadership 
literature has been on its consequences (Mayer et al., 2012; Schaubroeck et al., 2012). However, 
in conceptualizing ethical leadership, Brown, Treviño and Harrison (2005) relied on social 
learning theory which suggests that individuals learn by paying attention to the attitudes, values, 
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and behaviors of others. Importantly, it is not just followers who can learn from ethical leaders; 
leaders can also learn from followers. Thus, having a moral follower can change a leader’s 
behavior or values and attitudes. In spite of theoretical arguments for the effect of followers on 
the leader’s ethicality (Hernandez & Sitkin, 2012), relatively little empirical research exists. We 
are among the first to suggest and provide evidence that the use of moral symbols by followers 
can change the perception of the situation at hand and elicit inferences about the moral character 
of the displayer and thus, followers can guide their leaders’ behavior and reduce the occurrence 
of unethical acts in the workplace. 
Second, this work adds to the small but growing body of research which considers the 
role of interpersonal influence in behavioral ethics (Moore & Gino, 2013). A large body of work 
shows that moral identity internalization and symbolization guide individuals’ own actions (e.g., 
Aquino & Reed, 2002; Shao, Aquino, & Freeman, 2008; Winterich, Aquino, Mittal, & Swartz, 
2013). However, it is not clear whether the use of moral symbols can impact interpersonal 
dynamics by serving as a form of social influence. We have argued that exposure to moral 
symbols can elicit certain judgments and cognitions regarding the situation at hand as well as the 
displayer, and in turn, this can influence the targets’ behavior in general and their actions 
towards the displayer, thereby serving a social regulatory function. There is research 
demonstrating that people’s ethical decisions are influenced by how others in their immediate 
surrounds behave. For instance, studies have shown that if people observe an in-group member 
(e.g., a person from the same college) cheating, their likelihood of cheating increases; however, 
if the person observed cheating belongs to an out-group, people are less likely to cheat (Gino, 
Ayal, & Ariely, 2009; Gino, Gu, & Zhong, 2009).  
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Third, it contributes to the ongoing conversation regarding the importance of moral 
character in the workplace (e.g., Cohen, Panter, Turan, Morse, & Kim, 2014). Whereas extant 
work has demonstrated that employees classified as high moral character are less likely to 
commit harmful work behaviors and more likely to engage in prosocial organizational behaviors 
than their counterparts who are of low moral character, our work demonstrates how inferring that 
a subordinate has high moral character can influence his or her supervisor’s ethical behavior. 
Thus, our works suggests that there might be second order effects of moral character. We 
provided evidence for the role of inferences about the moral character of the displayer as an 
underlying psychological mechanism explaining how moral symbols influence supervisors’ 
behavior. This is important because even though the increase in moral awareness suggests an 
overall decrease in unethical behavior, it does not predict the differentiation between requesting 
the displayer versus other subordinates.  
Fourth, our work fills a void in the ethical leadership literature by investigating how 
subordinates influence their leader’s ethical behavior. Our findings lend credence to the idea that 
other people’s expressed moral character can serve to activate leaders’ moral awareness and 
cause them to behave in a manner consistent with ethical standards. This is in line with prior 
theoretical arguments conceptualizing ethical leadership as a social learning process (Brown & 
Treviño, 2006) as well as social information processing models (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978) that 
emphasize the role of context in decision making, more generally. Furthermore, we provide 
empirical support for Hernandez and Sitkin’s (2012) model in which they propose that followers 
can influence their leader’s ethicality in indirect and implicit ways. Our findings also contribute 
more generally to the leadership literature. There is a burgeoning movement within the 
leadership literature to explore more deeply the intersection of the domains of leadership and 
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identity (van Knippenberg, van Knippenberg, De Cremer, & Hogg, 2004). This body of work has 
emphasized the importance of understanding how and why facets of followers’ identities 
constitute boundary conditions of leadership effects. Here, we have examined how a 
subordinate’s moral identity (as inferred by the display of moral symbols) shapes the leader’s 
behavior and in turn, how this influences follower outcomes in the form of fewer unethical 
directives. 
Fifth, our research contributes to the literature on how social influence impacts 
individuals’ ethical decisions. Previous research has examined the effects of different contextual 
factors, organizational ethical culture (Treviño et al., 1998) and peer pressure from unethical 
coworkers (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Gino et al., 2009). In this paper, for the first time, we 
demonstrate that ethical nudges in the form of moral symbols have a powerful impact on 
individual decision making. Our work demonstrates that subtle forms of social influence such as 
moral symbols can influence decision makers regardless of their power. This has important 
implications given that ethical influences can occur in the context of power differences in 
organizations. Thus, our work suggests power does not always shield the decision maker from 
social influence.  
Sixth, while extensive research has examined the effects of moral identity (both 
internalization and symbolization) on individuals’ behaviors (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002), less 
empirical work has examined the consequences for actions of others exposed to such displays. In 
this paper, we examined how moral symbols can act as a form of social influence by impacting 
ethical behaviors of others. Furthermore, extant research on the effects of moral primes has not 
examined whether repeated exposure to such cues increases or decays their strength. Our field 
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study suggests that the effects of moral symbols may not wane over time due to repeated 
exposure.  
Finally, fear of retaliation is the primary reason for employees being generally reluctant 
to report work-rated transgressions (Miceli et al., 2013). And a large body of research 
acknowledges how difficult it is to “just say no” to a boss (Rolloff & Paulson, 2001; Treviño & 
Brown, 2004; Uhl-Bien & Carsten, 2007). Some recent research has identified that unethical 
behavior can be curbed by the use of explicit interventions such as introducing a code of ethics 
(Weaver, Treviño, & Cochran, 1999). The present work highlights the role that subtle 
interventions, such as the display of moral symbols, play in producing similar results. We also 
show that the use of moral symbols does not bring hidden backlash effects against those who 
display them. We offer a way to help employees to guide the leader’s behavior and avoid doing 
the unethical. Given that moral symbols appear to be relatively inexpensive, coupling them with 
formal ethics programs might improve the ethical climate of workplaces.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
This research is not without its fair share of shortcomings. First, though it demonstrates 
successfully the powerful effect of moral symbols, a number of our studies were conducted in 
controlled, laboratory environments. Some researchers have commented that because of the 
artificiality so characteristic of experimental settings, research done in the laboratory is limited in 
its ability to help us understand organizational phenomena. Critics of this stance have countered 
that laboratory research can offer powerful tests of conceptual propositions, including 
propositions of behavior in real-world organizations (e.g., Weick, 1965). Given that this paper 
explored for the very first time the effectiveness of moral symbols in preventing those in 
authority from issuing unethical directives, employing laboratory studies was reasonable. 
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Moreover, after conducting the laboratory studies, we tried to establish the generalizability of the 
findings by employing a diverse sample, namely employees in India. However, the robustness of 
these findings would be enhanced even more by testing the hypotheses in field settings in the 
western cultures such as the United States.   
It is important to note that even though our hypotheses focused on moral symbols 
displayed by subordinates, the “increased moral awareness” mechanism would suggest that mere 
exposure to the symbols should be sufficient, even if not displayed by a subordinate. For 
example, seeing your boss or even just a random person on the street with a t-shirt with a moral 
word might produce the proposed effect. In other words, the effect may be broader than our 
studies show.  
It is also possible that exposing superiors, especially the unethical ones, to moral symbols 
may result in undesirable side-effects. This may result in various forms of retaliation against that 
employee such as not being included in important decisions or work activities, being passed over 
for a raise or promotion, being relocated or reassigned to less desirable positions, or even being 
laid off. Even though in Study 6, there was no significant difference in the supervisor’s formal 
evaluation of the subordinate’s job performance as a function of whether the subordinate was a 
displayer of moral symbols, and in Studies 3-4 there seemed to be no detrimental side effects of 
displaying such symbols, yet it might be helpful for future studies to systematically examine the 
full consequences of the use of moral symbols in workplace.  
An additional issue that warrants further examination is that though exposure to moral 
symbols may cause the boss to make fewer unethical requests overall, if the boss does make an 
unethical request, it will be more likely to be directed towards those not displaying such symbols 
thereby resulting in a form of collateral damage. In other words, there might be incidental 
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negative consequences for others, and future work should explore possible ways that 
organizations can combat them. For instance, could organizations incorporate into their culture a 
few moral symbols that convey powerful meanings, and would doing so impart a stronger, 
shared value system such that even “non-display” employees come to be protected from 
unethical requests?  
In the laboratory studies described in this paper, the forms of unethical behaviors studied 
were chiefly of the pecuniary kind, where the supervisors stood to benefit monetarily by 
behaving unethically. Self-interested unethical behaviors were curbed by the display of moral 
symbols. However, it is unclear if the display of moral symbols may also result in a reduction in 
other forms of unethical behavior such as gender or racial discrimination or sexual harassment. 
Exploring a full spectrum of morally questionable workplace behaviors would be a helpful next 
step. 
As a first step, it was helpful to examine across laboratory studies the effects of two 
particular types of moral symbol, namely, a moral quotation at the bottom of an email and one’s 
clothes. Additionally, we examined the effect of using religious symbols as one type of moral 
symbols. However, it would be worthwhile to examine whether other forms of moral symbols 
are equally effective. Another possible venue for future work might be to examine the role of 
morality-related personality variables such as, moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002), moral 
chronicity (Lapsley & Navarez, 2004), and moral self-importance (Colby & Damon, 1992), as 
moderators of the effect of moral symbols on ethical decision making.  Moreover, future work 
could explore how and why inferring that a subordinate is moral dissuades supervisors from 
making unethical requests. 
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Also, throughout the paper, we side-stepped the issue of whether the displayers of moral 
symbols are actually moral. It is possible that people may be motivated to hide their true moral 
identities by strategically using moral symbols as an impression management technique (Bolino, 
1999). For example, Barkan, Ayal, Gino and Ariely (2012) found that the recall of unethical 
events motivated participants in a lab experiment to try and present themselves as moral when 
filling out a scale related to their own morality. Future work should explore the motivations and 
cognitions of those who display such symbols. Moreover, future work should examine whether 
the intentions behind the display of moral symbols influence their effectiveness. More 
specifically, it would be helpful to tease apart possible differences in the ways in which authentic 
and naturally occurring displays operate compared to displays that are intentional and strategic. 
For example, would an inauthentic representation of oneself by wearing a cross despite not being 
religious still serve to ward off unethical requests?  
Lastly, we would like to note that whereas we were able to identify a positive effect of 
the display of moral and religious symbols in the workplace, we acknowledge that there might be 
a dark side associated with such displays. For instance, people who display such symbols may 
become prey to self-serving assessment biases and end up feeling “feeling holier-than-thou” 
(Epley & Dunning, 2000) or provide vicarious moral credentials for the superior (Kouchaki, 
2011). Such feelings might subsequently result in moral self-licensing and possible unethical 
behavior (Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010). 
CONCLUSION 
In closing, this paper offers a promising solution to the problem of how to reduce the 
incidence of unethical behavior and requests in workplace. The results of the studies presented 
here show that by exposing superiors to moral symbols subordinates may lower overall instances 
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of unethical behaviors at work, and also dissuade superiors from asking them (i.e., subordinates 
displaying moral symbols), in particular, to engage in unethical behaviors. Exposure to moral 
symbols leads to the activation of the concept of morality to increase individuals’ moral 
awareness as well as to inferences about the moral character of the displayer, both guiding moral 
behavior and reducing the occurrence of unethical acts in the workplace. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations for Study 6. 
Variable  Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Unethical 
directives 2.95 1.49                             
 
2. Moral 
symbol 0.43 0.50 -0.31**                            
3. 
Subordinate 
gender 
0.63 0.48 0.04 -0.02                         
 
4. 
Subordinate 
age 
31.44 9.19 -0.30** 0.16 0.07                       
 
5. 
Subordinate 
job tenure 
4.39 1.40 -0.09 -0.05 0.00 -0.07                     
 
6. 
Supervisor 
gender 
0.89 0.31 -0.26** 0.24** -0.07 -0.05 -0.17*                   
 
7. 
Supervisor 
age 
41.44 6.08 0.11 -0.02 -0.17* 0.00 0.04 -0.10                 
 
8. 
Supervisor 
job tenure 
6.61 1.20 -0.10 -0.13 0.00 -0.06 0.50*** 0.00 -0.17*               
 
9. 
Supervisor-
subordinate 
tenure 
3.37 1.08 -0.15 0.09 -0.06 0.06 0.78*** -0.09 0.10 0.45***             
 
10. Job 
satisfaction 4.34 1.63 -0.05 0.08 -0.11 0.12 -0.14 -0.01 -0.10 -0.15 -0.09           
 
11.  Job 
performance 4.47 1.03 0.15 0.15 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.05 -0.02 0.05 -0.02 0.25**         
 
12. 
Religious 
dissimilarity 
0.13 1.09 -0.09 0.11 -0.13 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.07 -0.08 0.04 -0.13 -0.14       
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13. 
Relationship 
quality 
4.21  1.05  -0.03 0.04 -0.16 0.00 0.17* 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.22* -0.17 0.04 0.01     
 
14. 
Perceived 
moral 
character of 
subordinate 
4.04 1.23 -0.36*** 0.42*** -0.16 0.00 -0.08 0.26** 0.07 -0.21* 0.01 0.22* -0.05 0.19* 0.13  
 
15. Gender 
dissimilarity 0.42 0.49 0.07 -0.02 -0.78*** 0.01 -0.06 -0.22* 0.26** -0.06 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.14 0.17* -0.04 
 
16. Degree 
of exposure 2.88 0.92 0.17 0.05 -0.14 -0.14 -0.09 -0.07 0.03 -0.11 -0.11 0.21* 0.16 0.19* -0.17 0.05 0.13 
 
N = 104 dyads. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. Gender was coded 1 for males and 0 for females for both supervisors and subordinates. 
Table 2. Results of regression with unethical requests as the criterion variable (Study 6). 
 
Variable  
  
Criterion Variable:  
Unethical Directives 
   Model 1 Model 2 
Predictor:        
  Moral symbol    -.24* -0.14 
Mediator:        
   Perceived moral character 
of subordinate       -.28* 
Controls:        
   Subordinate gender    0.10 0.07 
   Subordinate age    -.25** -.28** 
   Subordinate job tenure    -0.10 -0.10 
   Supervisor gender    -0.22* -0.18 
   Supervisor age    0.06 0.09 
   Supervisor job tenure    -0.09 -0.12 
   Supervisor-subordinate   
tenure    -0.02 -0.01 
   Job satisfaction (self-
reported by subordinate)    -0.09 -0.02 
   Job performance (evaluated 
by superior)    0.18 0.13 
   Gender dissimilarity    -0.14 -0.11 
   Religious dissimilarity    -0.01 -0.02 
   Religious dissimilarity X 
Moral symbol    0.03 0.06 
   Relationship quality (LMX)    0.07 0.05 
   Degree of exposure    0.13 0.13 
R2    0.20 0.25 
F    2.74** 3.18*** 
Note. Standardized regression coefficients (betas) are shown. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
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Figure 1. Theoretical model for the link between display of moral symbols and moral decisions. 
Display of moral symbols leads to two main consequences: (i) increased moral awareness, in 
general, and (ii) perception that the displayer has high levels of moral character.  
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